ABSTRACT Existing anti-censorship and anonymizing systems like Tor rely on volunteers who run relays. In reality, the most challenging part, however, is to gather enough volunteers beyond altruism. There have been a few incentive schemes for volunteering, but they require external monetary resources or e-cash infrastructure. This paper presents SymBiosis, a web-browsing ecosystem that makes a case for direct benefit trading between censored users and uncensored users for their own resources. The two-way interaction in SymBiosis makes every user benefit (anonymity) from participation (relay), and in turn leads to a near-perfect circumvention system via ubiquitous relay deployment. On top of this, SymBiosis provides a practical relay structure, optimized for users' web-browsing experience. SymBiosis is fully implemented and tested in a real-world environment. The evaluation demonstrates that SymBiosis achieves both goals against today's most advanced censor systems and delivers usable performance for everyday web browsing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet censorship is pervasive today. Nearly 70% of countries around the world exercise various forms of online censorship to regulate their citizens' Internet access [1] . Despite ongoing efforts on Internet freedom, online censorship has intensified globally over the recent years [2] . As a result, a huge number of Internet users worldwide currently suffer from these restrictions.
Besides the active blocking, network surveillance is another type of prevalent threats even posed by the rest of the world against censorship [3] . Indeed, Internet activities can be massively monitored by various parties including government agencies [4] , seriously threatening users' privacy. In this sense, uncensored users as well as censored ones are all potential victims in peril.
One simple but powerful way to combat against such threats is to use external volunteers; if there exist many volunteer relays, then it will be extremely difficult for censors to block them all. There are quite a few systems [5] - [11] taking this approach. However, the critical missing piece is how to motivate for volunteering beyond altruistic users. For example, Tor [8] , today's most effective online privacy tool, all run by volunteers, was largely blocked by repressive governments like China [12] . There are a few incentive proposals [13] - [15] , but they require external monetary resources or e-cash infrastructure to encourage users to run relays.
In this paper we introduce SymBiosis, a web-browsing ecosystem that achieves anti-censorship and anonymity via direct benefit trading between censored users and uncensored users for their own resources. With its practical properties, SymBiosis provides users with near-normal latency webbrowsing experience. It is a user-friendly and easy-to-use system that runs on standard protocols for web browsing. SymBiosis is infrastructure-independent, thus deployable in today's Internet. SymBiosis achieves these through the following techniques:
Two-Way Interaction for Trading Benefits: SymBiosis takes a direct incentive approach where its participants interact with each other to the advantage of both. Censored users offer an anonymity service to uncensored ones in exchange for their help with censorship circumvention and privacy protection. This two-way beneficial interaction, without external monetary resources, turns all participants into relays, which would otherwise have a limited number of volunteer relays without reward. Such an increased relay count makes it a near-perfect circumvention system overwhelming censors via ubiquitous relay deployment.
Simplified Circuits for Efficient Relay Processing: SymBiosis employs a circuit to expedite the two-way communication between participants, whose operations are simple and add minimal load not to deter potential users from engaging in the system. Only the ends of a circuit perform a circuit-level encryption for privacy protection, and the middle one simply passes the traffic intact along the circuit. In addition, SymBiosis assigns a different circuit to each participant, limiting the number of circuits involved in each two-way transaction and thus, circuit multiplexing, when necessary, becomes quite a simple task.
Web-Browsing-Oriented Internal Protocols: SymBiosis builds a circuit on top of the standard TLS/TCP protocols for web browsing, and further optimizes their operations to improve users' web experience. SymBiosis exploits multiple two-way associations of each individual participant, whenever possible, to distribute HTTP requests across multiple circuits, i.e., parallel transactions, to reduce web response time. Also, when multiplexing circuits, SymBiosis prioritizes (small) HTTP requests over (large) HTTP responses to further accelerate web performance. In addition, SymBiosis takes advantage of such asymmetric nature of web traffic to invite more users. In certain cases, relaying users simply deflect the upstream traffic (small-sized URLs) statelessly and connectionlessly to backend proxy(s), who take over TLS/TCP sessions by spoofing such users' IP. This lowers the bar for potential participants with limited resources.
SymBiosis is fully implemented and tested in a realworld environment. The source code is available under a free license [16] . The evaluation demonstrates that SymBiosis successfully achieves anonymity and circumvention against today's most advanced censor systems and delivers usable performance for everyday web browsing.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been many proposals for censorship resistance and anonymity provision. One typical circumvention strategy is to use proxies [17] , [18] , fetching blocked webpages on users' behalf. However, those proxies are also known to insiders and the censors can detect and block them all.
To hide proxy connections, several researchers have proposed the use of cover-protocols. They pretend legitimate audio or video traffic to tunnel IP traffic through proxies via Skype-like communication [19] or mimic VoIP sessions [20] , [21] . Recent studies [22] , however, demonstrate their vulnerability to censors' active probing due to mismatches between the cover-and the proxy-protocols. Besides, the use of cover-protocols incurs increased latency because of voice-traffic mimicry, also makes their systems less user-friendly for web browsing.
Several researchers have proposed another type of circumvention systems including Telex [23] , Decoy routing [24] , and Cirripede [25] , all collectively called decoy routing. Their approach is to have (transparent) proxies embedded within the network itself. The merits of decoy routing are that (1) the proxies are not exposed to insiders and (2) it can achieve lowlatency communication due to their use of standard TLS/TCP protocols. However, recent studies [26] discuss new attacks by routing-capable censors bypassing through the decoys. Apart from that, decoy routing requires cooperation among several trusted ISPs to strategically place the hidden proxies and extra investment to their infrastructure.
One practical way to balance between usability and security is to use volunteers. The idea is simple but powerful: if there exist many volunteers offering relay services, then it will be extremely difficult for censors to block them all. There are quite a few systems taking this approach for circumvention [5] - [7] and anonymity [8] , [9] , [11] . However, in reality, the most challenging part is to gather enough volunteers; the number of volunteers hardly goes beyond that of altruistic users, and the censors can enumerate them. For example, Tor [8] , run by volunteer relays, was largely blocked by the censoring ISPs as in China [12] .
To encourage users to become relays, several incentive schemes have been proposed so far. They use electronic cash [13] , [14] or redeemable credits/tickets [15] to produce monetary incentives, or give priority service to fast relays [27] . This is a step forward compared to other systems whose volunteers get no benefit. However, they require external monetary resources and e-cash infrastructure. On the other hand, SymBiosis takes a natural incentive approach via direct benefit trading between participants for their own resources.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. THREAT MODEL
We consider both censorship by censoring ISPs and network surveillance in censor-free ISPs collectively as our adversaries.
Online Censorship: Users under the control of censors are not allowed to connect with certain websites. We use the terms censors and censoring ISPs interchangeably to refer to network providers that monitor and filter their users' Internet access, ranging from local-to state-level infrastructure. They employ a set of advanced technologies, e.g., IP address blocking, deep packet inspection, and DNS hijacking, to enforce their regulations. They also maintain a blacklist of censorship circumvention tools such as proxy servers and anonymity services, to prevent the users from eluding their control. Upon such new techniques, the censor uses many insiders to discover and emasculate them via enumeration attacks. The censor further launches more sophisticated techniques like traffic analysis on a suspicious flow. For example, the censor applies an interference probing on cover-channels, e.g., targeted packet dropping [22] , so that web browsing over non-standard protocols, e.g., HTTP over VoIP [19] - [21] , is a particularly difficult, if not impossible, task. On the other hand, we assume that the censor allows the users' access to any other remote hosts unless they invite suspicion. In other words, the censor is not willing to blacklist the entire IP address space, hence a complete ''shutdown'' of the Internet.
Network Surveillance: Users in censor-free ISPs have complete freedom to access any websites, but their Internet activities are subject to network surveillance. Our concern on Internet activity is linkability of sender (user) and receiver (website) rather than detectability of whether users are using the Internet. Even with encryption like SSL/TLS, such activities are exposed by various entities in diverse locations. In the case of direct Internet access, target websites can identify such information. Users' ISPs also can silently monitor such activities using transparent proxies (or interception proxies), without letting users know the existence of these proxies, to redirect all traffic to go through them, performing a man-inthe-middle action. In the case of using external proxy services intended by users, then the proxies in question can trace the users' Internet activities. If not using encryption, every node along the path can identify such information. We assume that every single entity mentioned above is a potential adversary with respect to network surveillance.
B. SYSTEM GOALS
SymBiosis seeks to achieve the following goals:
Unblockability: The censor should not be able to block SymBiosis without blacklisting the majority of IP addresses, nearly disconnecting its users from the Internet.
Unobservability: The censor should not be able to to determine whether users are using SymBiosis.
Unlinkability: Any entity should not be able to tell which SymBiosis users communicate with which websites.
Low Latency: SymBiosis should provide users with satisfactory web-browsing experience at near-normal latency.
Usability: SymBiosis should reject hard-to-use designs, and be implemented using standard protocols for web browsing, e.g., TLS/TCP, over common platforms. 
IV. SymBiosis OVERVIEW
A. SymBiosis PRIMER Figure 1 illustrates the basic framework of SymBiosis. The main components are:
• Bee-hosts (BH s): web-browsing hosts, residing in censoring ISPs, that aim to make unobservable communication with target websites anonymously.
• Flower-hosts (FH s): web-browsing hosts in censor-free ISPs, who wish to connect with target websites anonymously. These hosts should be externally accessible.
• SymBiosis servers (SS): distributed server(s), as part of the SymBiosis system with IP spoofing capability, 1 that interacts with FH s and covertly with BH s, and proxies communication with the target websites. Every participant in SymBiosis (i.e., BH s and FH s) performs two roles: (1) web client function for its own good, and (2) transit service for others towards SS. (For ease of exposition, we treat SS as a single server in this section, and describe the complete system with distributed SSes in Section VI.). On top of that, SymBiosis has two unique features. First, there is a direct communication session between a certain pair of BH and FH, and this relationship is hidden to SS. Second, the client function and the transit service operate only between such a pair of participants (not for arbitrary ones), thereby sending and receiving their own web traffic via each other. As they are directly engaged in mutually beneficial interaction, we call it a symbiotic relationship as in nature; bees (BH s) depend on flowers (FH s) for nectar (transit service) to produce honey (circumvention and anonymity), while flowers (FH s) need bees (BH s) to help pollinate (anonymity via transit service). As a similar analogy, we call such a pair symbionts.
In order to actualize this symbiotic system, we need to address the following issues:
• How to arrange legitimate communication channels for symbionts in face of today's sophisticated censors?
• How to make BH s perform a transit service towards SS who is blacklisted in censoring ISPs?
• How to anonymize communication so that anyone cannot link between original sources and destinations? The following sections answer these questions in detail, and describe the complete framework and its protocol design.
B. CONNECTIVITY
Every FH is a potential symbiont for any BH, and vice versa. To participate the system, BH first makes a TLS connection with its symbiont FH, essentially one of any available FH s in the system. This legitimate connection is henceforth used/shared for both symbionts' web traffic. In other words, there is a single shared TLS connection between a pair of symbionts; neither of them attempts to set up separate connections for themselves. This is to achieve better robustness against traffic analysis as discussed later in Section VI-C.
Once associated, FH makes a TLS connection with SS exclusively for its symbiont BH. This is to arrange a circuit for this BH by joining two path segments (i.e., two TLS connections): BH − FH and FH − SS. When building this circuit, the symbiotic relationship between BH and FH is not revealed to SS as described in Section V-B.
Likewise, BH makes a (covert) TLS connection with SS to arrange a circuit for its symbiont FH. To this end, BH initiates a fake connection to another FH, who, in this case, simply deflects packets towards SS, so we call it a deflector. SS responds directly to BH by spoofing the deflector's IP, with SS IP address not revealed. Hence, the censor sees a legitimate connection, while the actual TLS/TCP session is maintained between BH and SS. The circuit for symbiont FH is built by joining two TLS connections: FH − BH and BH − SS. Note that, while BH 's association with the deflector is known to SS, its relationship with symbiont FH is still hidden from SS.
C. BH-INITIATED WEB TRANSACTION
We first describe the web browsing procedure from BH perspective. Figure 2 shows such an example.
Censorship Circumvention: Once set up (as in Section IV-B), BH1 is ready to use a circuit towards SS. This circuit (BH1 − FH1 − SS) is built exclusively for BH1, thus called a BH1-circuit. Using this circuit with FH1's IP-address legitimate to the censor, BH1 is able to communicate with any target websites in the face of the censor.
Anonymous Communication: The BH-circuit itself, while achieving censorship circumvention, does not yet provide anonymous communication; FH1 can still identify both original source (BH1) and destination (target website). To enable anonymity, messages are encrypted with a shared key between BH1 and SS before transmission. This key is obtained using Diffie-Hellman key exchange [28] over BH1-circuit so that the identity of BH1 is not revealed to SS during the key agreement phase, as detailed in Section V-B.
D. FH-INITIATED WEB TRANSACTION
We next describe the web browsing procedure from FH perspective. Figure 2 shows such an example.
Anonymous Communication: Similarly, FH1 is ready to use a circuit toward SS exclusively for FH1, hence a FH1-circuit (FH1 − BH1 − SS). To provide anonymity, messages are likewise encrypted with a shared key between FH1 and SS via Diffie-Hellman key exchange over FH1-circuit. Therefore, neither BH1 nor SS can identify both ends of the communication, source (FH1) and destination (website). One interesting aspect of BH1-circuit and FH1-circuit is that they share the first path segment of their circuits (i.e., BH1 ↔ FH1). This is due to a single shared TLS connection between a pair of symbionts, whose internal protocol design and security aspect will be discussed in Section V-D and Section VI-C, respectively.
Traffic Deflection: Within FH1-circuit, the covert channel between BH1 and SS, in part, relies on deflector FH2, who is in fact not a direct beneficiary of this transaction; FH2 benefits from its symbiont BH4 (for example in Figure 1) , not from BH1 or FH1. In that sense, this deflector role is an additional service required for FH s to participate the system. We however note that this creates minimal load on FH s without negating the benefit of participating the system. This deflecting function is stateless, connectionless, and light-weight, which handles only the upstream web traffic (e.g., URLs) that is much lighter-weight than the downstream traffic as in Section V-E.
V. SymBiosis DESIGN
In this section we present the concrete design of SymBiosis and its protocol operations in detail. 
A. CELLS
In SymBiosis, a circuit is a chain of two TLS connections, which is exclusively assigned to a single participant. To facilitate the operations over such a circuit, SymBiosis employs fixed-sized cells, similar to Tor, as the unit of communication over the circuit, but its structure and operations are much simpler as described in the following sections. As shown in Figure 3 , each cell is 1024 bytes, and consists of a header and a payload. The header has four fields. Type indicates the type of message contained in Data field. Length specifies the valid data size (in bytes) in Data field. StreamID is a stream identifier for the multiplexing purpose. Digest is for circuitlevel end-to-end integrity protection, e.g., SHA-2 (256 bits). Note that a cell does not contain a field for circuit identifiers in its header. We will explain this design choice along with session sharing in Section V-D.
B. ANONYMIZING A CIRCUIT
To initiate communication over a circuit, both ends of the circuit need to agree on a secret key to enable anonymity. We use BH1-circuit (BH1 − FH1 − SS) as an example to describe the key agreement procedure as it is identical for every participant (for both BH s and FH s). To keep BH1 unknown to SS, the process is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange [28] . More specifically, we use a slightly-modified version of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman to protect from a manin-the-middle attack and support perfect forward secrecy. Figure 4 illustrates such key agreement and a subsequent web transaction. BH1 first generates its own secret x, and sends to SS a cell with a Diffie-Hellman public key g x in Data and 'key-request' specified in Type. SS responds with a cell(s) containing its certificate, a signed temporary public key g y , and a hash of the resulting key K , with 'key-response' in Type. Upon reception of this cell, BH1 verifies the the authenticity of SS temporary key g y using the signature, and makes sure that they both establish the same shared key K = g xy via the hashed value. Note that this process requires that only SS prove itself to BH1, hence one-way authentication. As a result, the identity of BH1 remains anonymous to SS. In other words, SS does not know whom FH is currently in a symbiotic relationship with.
On a successful key setup, the shared key K is used to derive four symmetric keys: one for encryption or message authentication code (MAC) key for each direction. Every message is henceforth encrypted using a derived key before being packaged into a cell. Also, MAC is generated and put into Digest field. Accordingly, the middle node (FH1) cannot see the original message (e.g., URL) or alter the cell contents, while the receiving end of the circuit (SS) can decrypt the message but fails to identify the original source (BH1).
C. TCP STREAM MULTIPLEXING ON A CIRCUIT
SymBiosis multiplexes multiple TCP streams over each circuit. More specifically, once a circuit is built for a certain participant BH1, then BH1's web transactions are henceforth multiplexed through its designated circuit, BH1-circuit. This is to improve efficiency by avoiding the overhead of separate circuits that would otherwise require multiple TLS handshakes and key setup operations for every HTTP request.
Upon a message, a cell is constructed and sent along the circuit, thereby multiplexing at the sending end of the circuit. For example, BH1 constructs cells (e.g., HTTP requests on multiple streams) with distinguishable StreamIDs and multiplexes them over BH1-circuit. The entire contents of a cell (both header and message) are encrypted or decrypted via TLS sessions along the circuit. The middle node (FH1) simply passes the cells intact along the circuit (note: Type field needs checking for session sharing as explained in the next section). The receiving end of the circuit (SS), once verifying cell integrity, performs de-multiplexing based on the StreamIDs. For return traffic, the operations are similar. Only difference is that now SS multiplexes HTTP responses over the circuit (by constructing cells with consistent StreamIDs as in HTTP requests) while BH1 de-multiplexes them. We again note that every message contained in a cell is encrypted with a shared key between both ends of the circuit (BH1 and SS) before the cell passes over TLS encryptions.
D. TLS SESSION SHARING FOR CIRCUITS
As mentioned in Section IV-D, each pair of symbionts share the first path segment of their circuits. For example (see Figure 2 ), a single TLS session (BH1 ↔ FH1) is used by both BH1-circuit and FH1-circuit, and therefore we need to multiplex these two circuits over this specific TLS session.
One straightforward way would be to have an additional field for a circuit identifier in a cell to specify which circuit the cell refers to. However, we do not take this option for two reasons: (1) the number of circuits sharing this TLS session is only two (not multiple), so circuit identifiers are likely overkill; and (2) each circuit uses this shared session in an exactly opposite way thereby distinguishable by their operations. More specifically, from BH1 perspective as in Figure 2 , any request-type messages received from this session (BH1 ← FH1) are not associated with BH1's transactions (i.e., not BH1-circuit), thus need to be forwarded along FH1-circuit, while every response-type message belongs to BH1's transactions (i.e., BH1-circuit) therefore needs further de-multiplexing so as to deliver it back to the original stream. From FH1's point of view, the same criteria can also be used to differentiate these circuits over the shared session.
We thus choose to use Type field in a cell for the session sharing purpose as well. The sending end of each circuit specifies in Type field the type of message in the cell (e.g., HTTP request/response, key request/response, etc) in order to invoke a desired action on the receiving end of the circuit. Then, the other nodes along the circuit, especially upon reception of the cell from the shared sessions, determine their action depending on whether the message is for request or response based on Type field.
E. TRAFFIC DEFLECTION AND IP SPOOFING
The covert TLS/TCP session within FH -circuit is accomplished by packet deflection (upstream) and IP spoofing VOLUME 4, 2016 (downstream). Each FH (say FH2) runs a deflector service on any random port d. A certain BH initiates a TCP handshake to FH2 on port d to make a covert channel with SS. However, FH2 does not react to any received packets (e.g., TCP SYN) on port d. This is done by disabling the operating system's TCP reaction on port d (e.g., using raw sockets as implemented in Section VII). Instead, upon a packet received on port d, FH2 simply encapsulates the IP packet intact into a UDP datagram destined to SS. Thus, the deflecting service itself is stateless and connectionless on both sides (BH and SS), while SS has the complete TCP information to respond directly to BH, by spoofing its source IP with FH2's IP.
On the other hand, one issue with SS is that not all Internet hosts can launch IP spoofing due to AS-level filtering [20] . According to the CMAND Spoofer project [29] that collected the most recent 12 months of IP spoofing tests, 25.5% ASes permit IP spoofing. Thus, SS needs to be deployed in such ASes. One can use some tools from the Spoofer project [29] to determine a suitable site for SS. We discuss our practical solutions to relax the IP spoofing requirement in Section VI-A.
VI. SymBiosis IN THE WILD
In this section we describe and address some of the practical and security issues of the SymBiosis system. 
A. DISTRIBUTED SS DEPLOYMENT
To scale to many participants, a large-scale deployment distributing SSes across multiple sites should be considered. This however requires all sites be IP 'spoofable', which is a somewhat stringent constraint for wide-scale distribution. Our solution is to have some legal institutions like universities run their own SSes, 2 and let their users (FH s) use such internal SSes as in Figure 5 . This is quite feasible in that (1) IP spoofing is largely permitted within the same subnetwork, and (2) a deflective relationship does not need to be a secret from SS. Accordingly, each symbiotic pair of BH-and FH-curcuits, in this case, may not share the same SS.
We also envision another type of global-scale deployment strategy where not all SSes require IP spoofing. Many 'unspoofable' SSes perform solely the proxy service having TLS connections with participants, and a few spoofable SSes take a role of spoofing IPs for downstream traffic (a stateless and connectionless service similar to deflectors). This hierarchical, distributed structure will support far more participants than the basic design, overcoming its potential performance bottleneck.
B. PRIORITIZING CELLS ON A SHARED SESSION
A single TLS session is shared by two symbiont circuits, and this can cause head-of-line (HOL) blocking. For example, BH1 may not forward its HTTP request to FH1 (via BH1-circuit) until completion of on-going HTTP response delivery to FH1 (via FH1-circuit) . This will increase web response time (WRT), downgrading user experience when the size of an HTTP response is big. To improve WRT, we give a high priority on cells containing HTTP request(s) over HTTP response(s). We make this design choice for three reasons: (1) having a small HTTP request cut through a large HTTP response will resolve the HOL case without an out-of-order delivery problem as they are on different circuits, (2) expedite web requests by sending them immediately, and (3) create a negligible impact on HTTP response delivery because an HTTP request is much smaller than its counterpart.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Enumeration Attack: The censors may collude with insiders (corrupt BH s) to discover and block FH s. This is one of the most powerful technique currently exercised by the censors. For example, the Chinese censors were able to enumerate Tor bridges [30] . This task would however become more difficult in SymBiosis given that (1) symbiont discovery is privately done via ones' personal contacts whenever possible, (2) some FH s have dynamic IPs (inherently ports as well) and (3) they join and leave the system intermittently.
On the other hand, FH s, once blacklisted by the censors, can be disconnected from the system. However, they also can easily regain connectivity. According to the recent investigation [12] on the Great Firewall of China (GFC), today's most advanced censor system, it blocks suspicious hosts by ''IP:port tuples'' (not by IPs), 3 and even those tuples become reachable again after 12 hours of inactivity. Thus, such FH s, upon blocked, simply change their ports only (with the same IPs) and reclaim their connections immediately.
Traffic Analysis: Each pair of symbionts shares a single TLS connection, which might otherwise be subject to traffic analysis. For example, using separate connections, particularly one for FH -circuit, might get suspicion from the censors as more traffic would flow outwards (BH → FH ), i.e., HTTP responses for FH. We thus take a two-way communication approach, i.e., a single shared TLS session, where BH 's traffic also flows inwards (BH ← FH ) on this specific session. This obfuscates symbiont connections and, as a side benefit, simplifies the circuit establishment process on both sides.
In addition, we can further resist traffic analysis by allowing FH s to exploit multiple circuits on their symbionts. Specifically, a single FH, connected with multiple BH s, distributes its HTTP requests across multiple FH -circuits so as to make each two-way session look more normal. We note that, as a side benefit, this also achieves parallel transactions and load balancing thereby improving web response time.
Certificate Fingerprinting: The censors may try to detect the covert TLS connection between BH and SS based on SS certificate that is publicly verifiable. To address this, SS uses a one-time certificate for a TLS handshake with BH to elude fingerprinting by the censors. 4 In fact, SS, when building a circuit, needs to authenticate itself only to the other end of the circuit (FH ) as in Section V-B. Recall that the covert channel is exclusively used for FH -circuit (not for BH itself). So, SS thereafter provides the original certificate to FH over the covert channel that is TLS-protected from the censors. Note that malicious nodes impersonating SS could set up a covert channel with BH but eventually fail to build a circuit with FH without the original certificate.
Colluding Participants: One can consider three types of collusion in the SymBiosis system: (1) BH ↔ FH ; (2) BH ↔ SS; (3) FH ↔ SS. The first case of two colluding symbionts BH and FH, possibly under the control of the censors, only reveals the identify of SS. This however cannot thwart other (honest) BH s' operations, on which any fingerprints of SS are not observable from the censors' point of view.
The latter two types of collusion, on the other hand, may disrupt the system. More specifically, they can be considered as 'honeypot', e.g., colluding BH and SS owned by the censors, or colluding FH and SS by malicious third parties, attempting to break the anonymity of original sources and destinations. This can be prevented by strong trust control of SS certificates such that any other entities in the network cannot impersonate SSes. To this end, we expect to have an authoritative SS, who is a trust anchor and issues SS certificates only to trusted parties in a centralized way. By doing this, attackers who act as FH s (or BH s) fail to impersonate SSes because they cannot build a circuit with BH (or FH ) without the original SS certificate (plus the corresponding SS private key).
In this way, SymBiosis achieves anonymity with its twohop circuit where the last hop is always the trusted entity (i.e., SSes). Note that Tor uses a three-hop circuit where all hops along the circuit are equal-weight entities.
Free-Riding Attacks: Selfish users may attempt to exploit the system only for its own good without offering transit service for others. Such free-riding behavior would spoil the SymBiosis ecosystem and must be discouraged. So, upon association between symbionts, if one of them refuses to relay traffic, the other simply disconnects the session and finds another symbiont, like BitTorrent's tit-for-tat [31] . Thus, one has to serve the other in order to get served in return.
For FH s neglecting the deflector service, BH reports to SS, anonymously via BH -circuit, about such FH in question. SS decides its action based on an actual probe into the FH to sort out false reports. Various techniques can also be applied such as reputation-based methods, statistical approaches, etc. Upon the report determined true, SS disconnects the session with the FH, hence the exclusion from the system.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide an outline of a prototype implementation [16] of SymBiosis based on the design detailed in Section V. All of the features are currently built on Linux.
A. BH and FH
The BH and the FH are quite similar on implementation. Most of their functions are in fact like mirrored images of each other because they both act as web clients and relays. For the client function, we employ at each BH /FH a local proxy, through which a user's browser, without modification, can use SymBiosis. This proxy internally performs circuit management procedures such as circuit establishment, circuit multiplexing, and TCP stream (de)multiplexing. To implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement when building a circuit, we use curve25519 library, 5 a state-of-the-art elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman function that offers a high level of security at very fast speed. For circuit multiplexing over a shared TLS session, we maintain a simple priority-queue for each BH /FH to prioritize cells with its own HTTP requests over HTTP responses for its symbiont. For TLS connection, we use OpenSSL 1.0.1g library. 6 We implement parallel transactions, currently based on a simple round-robin to evenly distribute web requests over multiple circuits.
The deflecting function, specific to FH, uses raw sockets to catch upstream packets (of a covert channel) along with their TCP/IP headers. We employ iptables, 7 a local firewall built into the Linux kernel, to mask/filter the operating system's TCP reaction, upon reception of TCP SYN, on this specific port. (Note: it would otherwise return TCP RST packets back to the original sender BH, thus disrupting the covert session.) The received IP packets with their headers intact are sent to SS using standard UDP sockets, hence UDP encapsulation.
B. SymBiosis SERVER (SS)
The SS consists of two components: circuit management and proxy service. The circuit management itself very much resembles that of BH /FH described above. One unique part is the procedure to manage a covert channel with BH. To perform UDP decapsulation, SS uses a UDP socket extracting the original TCP packet (with FH for destination). SS passes the extracted packet into TUN device, 8 a virtual-network kernel devices, to emulate its reception from an external source. We apply nat rules to iptables so that SS acts like a transparent proxy, thus spoofing its source IP address with FH 's IP for return packets. For TCP stream (de)multiplexing, SS maintains a mapping table, and communicates to the proxy service with demultiplexed streams, making both components largely independent of each other.
For the proxy service itself, we use Squid 9 (version 3.1.19), a popular and mature proxy software. Note that the proxy service is mostly independent from the main features of SymBiosis, thus any proxy software would work. To further support HTTPS, we configure Squid so that it can process the CONNECT request method of HTTP protocol, hence TCP tunneling through Squid to an HTTPS website.
VIII. EVALUATION
We answer three questions about Symbiosis in this section:
• Does it achieve censorship circumvention?
• Does it provide usable performance for web browsing?
• Does each participant affect others' performance?
Evaluation Results: We first confirm that all BH s (as well as their symbiont FH ) in SymBiosis have successfully downloaded the webpage of en.wikipedia.org whose server DNS names and IP addreses are currently blocked in China. We then measure the web response time for the same webpage when only one BH accesses the website and downloads the content. Figures 6a and 6b show the results of downloading time for the base HTML file and the full page, respectively. We see that SymBiosis provides usable performance; its downloading times, both for the base HTML file and the full page, are comparable to the proxy-based scheme. Moreover, the latency gap between SymBiosis and the direct Internet access is not very big: 1 -2 second difference in most cases, within an acceptable range for usual web browsing.
We next evaluate the downloading time when symbionts BH (in China) and FH (in Kentucky, U.S.) both perform web transactions through each other. The main purpose of this experiment is to see whether two symbionts affect each other's performance as they share the same TLS session. The results of downloading times, measured at BH, are presented in Figures 6c and 6d . The results of FH are almost the same. We observe that (1) the results are quite similar to the single BH case, and (2) the two-way interaction does not (negatively) affect each other's performance. This is mostly on account of the asymmetric nature of web browsing traffic. That is, while a single TCP session is shared/used by two symbionts at the same time, their data flows (i.e., voluminous downstream traffic) are in the opposite directions, thus not hurting each other's performance. This can be also explained in part by the cell prioritization where (small) HTTP requests cut through (large) HTTP responses to avoid potential congestion delays.
We also assess the downloading time when 20 BH s (in China) all conduct web transactions through the same symbiont FH (in Kentucky, U.S.), and this FH also performs web transactions jointly via these BH s. Figure 6e plots the results, measured at one BH, of downloading time for the full page. We see that the downloading times are still comparable to the proxy-based scheme. The results of the other BH s are largely the same. This is interpreted that different participants that share the same symbiont do not disrupt each other's web performance. The reasons are collectively that (1) the separate circuit management, i.e., a different circuit to each participant over a separate TCP session, eliminates otherwise non-negligible circuit-multiplexing delays, (2) the simplified circuit operations further reduce the end-to-end delay, and (3) there is relatively little discrepancy in traffic volume among participants because web browsing itself is less likely to require bandwidth-intensive communication.
Another interesting result (as presented in Figure 6f ) is that the FH, while handling these BH s, also exhibits similar performance, even slightly faster to download the full page in general. We believe that this is due to parallel transactions exploiting multiple circuits, and using a more advanced technique, instead of the current round-robin utilization, can further improve the performance.
Summary of Evaluation Results:
Our results show that SymBiosis successfully circumvents today's most advanced censor system and delivers usable performance, mostly 1 -2 seconds different from direct Internet access. In addition, both BH and FH show similar web response times. This demonstrates that the deflecting function on FH -circuit, while making a one-hop longer upstream path than that of BH -circuit, has negligible impact on users' web browsing experience. SymBiosis also provides consistently stable performance under various connectivity scenarios. Specifically, even multiple two-way associations sharing the same participant do not disrupt one another's performance. Throughout the experiments, we also confirm anonymity such that no entity in the network (neither BH s, FH s, nor SS) can identify both ends of the communication, original source and destination.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper presented SymBiosis, a web-browsing ecosystem that makes a case for direct benefit trading between censored users and uncensored users for their own resources. The key insight is to turn the conventional volunteer-based one-way service into two-way anonymity-supported interaction between censored and uncensored users, thus making it a near-perfect circumvention system with ubiquitous relay deployment. We design a practical relay structure, optimized for web browsing. We have fully implemented and tested SymBiosis in a real-world environment. The evaluation results have demonstrated that SymBiosis achieves both goals against the most advanced censors and delivers usable performance for everyday web browsing. The source code is freely available at https://github.com/symbiosis322/symbiosis.
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